So what do mean 1854 the Crimean War phase, and in 1914 – the outbreak of World War I and the related goals of the war powers – for us today – namely 2015? Again and again, in the last 30 years, the feeling might come to live in a war. In the story – like 1815, 1918-19, 1945 – repeats the same process. The international system regrouping. Within a decade, is determining what will be the victorious powers of the conflict, and what will come in the end at the top?
Descending powers tend to military means, in order to stop the decline. This is true of the German Empire after 1871/1904/05, the British Empire in the 1930ies and again in 1956, as the Soviet Union of Afghanistan phase. During these periods was developed a special sensitivity of the ruling elites for the eventuality that may arise from such situations. In the 80ies, in the face of possible future c o n v e n t i o n a l w a r i n E u r o p e , the historical data were examined from the viewpoint of how emerged the great disasters of the 20th century. Not least, the political science approaches of the early 70ies led to reflect on the dangers that could arise from the oppression of the Soviet Union this year by the US, China and NATO. And this is shown from different sides, in the course of the 80ties again (Paul M. Kennedy); derived from the historical and political question, the „rise and fall of civilizations“ (G.P. Gooch).
We went with another analytical approach to the potentially successful blockade of military conflict between the United States and the UdSSR; and this, for example, explained by Henry Kissinger, on the supposedly perfect restitution of the world after 1815. Their ample function, however, by the repression of Russia, due to the Crimean War, lead in the end to this model.
However, till today, to the exclusion of military force found in the international system, it did not come. And, as expected, in science, the exclusion of war between the United States and the UdSSR could not change realities, in regard of the influence of resources, allocation etc. There was an assumption to refute after a conflict, fought as to the distribution of power, and the expectation that this would turn out better than before. A peaceful process will not produce as clear results. In the case of the German Empire, in this respect, one could mean that it would not have come to its foundation. Also, the Treaty of Frankfurt in 1871, prove to have been inconclusive. Germany reached but only a semi hegenonial position, and moved to 1914 before this next conflict between the powers might have cleared the parities between the European powers, according to their industrial, military and diplomatic-political priorities.
So even after 1945, wars between united States generally lead to clear hierarchies. These are, according to general opinion, even of „long durée“. But that these forces will develop as increasingly unstable, the leading power can recognize changes in it’s the economic, industrial and technological field. The „index of concentration“, like the full width of the various sectors, had an answer in the course of the 80ies, also in relation to the United States, and, above all, the USSR. The comparison of the abilities of the leading power and the competing large powers can lead to the realization that – in spite of trade and commerce – first differences occur. While the interest of the United States, during the 80ies toward the USSR, it came down to see to what extent the minor states tried in COMECON and the Warsaw Pact, to be released from this spheres of influence; but just since 1991, the United States underlie similar divergent trends in their system of alliances (NATO/EU).
Nevertheless, the result in the case of the Soviet Union resulted in:
– the processes of a closer union in the Alliance,
– as well as just to enforce the tendency to achieve greater freedom of mouvemet inn respect to the hegemonic power.
In addition, this will produce, in combination with decreasing control over the weaker powers, an increasingly weaker and more and more erratic safety policy. These expectations were mirrored by events that occurred in the western glacis of the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union. 1953, -56 and -68 Moscow in this process answered decreasing gravity by a regulatory fashion. According to the expectations after the end of victorious wars, this increasing abrasion of power in respect to Moscow’s position, corresponded under Andropov/Gromyko, Bethmann Hollweg/Moltke, Hitler/Ribbentrop, Stalin/Molotov.
Ever, an increasing lack of leadership was responsible, when the United States headed as well for a moment of weakness. The state-supporting forces find, in such situations, and in the result of the analysis of the last 150 years, no adequate response to the change in the general political conditions (including the Russian Tsar Nicholas I).
Unilateral reactions demonstrate the inadequate response of the (often) single minded, militarily dominated, ruling elites. Cramp-like search for new contacts alliance, the military ressurcen being strengthened, which achieved solely and unspoken a superficial effect of self-affirmation. For the United States are about to descend, and have, in comparison with the circumstances of the other countries, tried to compensate this by a reinforced military sector. At the same time this ailing power structure reaches a lower success than those states that operate at lower power means.
In addition succumb to the temptation of such powers to overreact militarily, and to be increasingly drawn into disputes. One of the main effects is the escalation of the use of power. Leading powers in particular are so inclined at the moment of falling from a previous power and size, short or medium term, less responsive flexible and adaptable. The effects of increasing militarization in governance and society, especially a militant view of general policy, in effect increasing mass failures, and connected to an escalating crisis management, result in greater readiness for war. This may fit in our latest times for the US, as for Russia, but also the EU. On a world scale. in any event, the northern hemisphere is no longer at the top of development. This has the rapid rise of China announced (stable growth of the gross national product, PMKennedy (1986), would lead China to world power standard in 1990). The German Empire of 1914 in any case trod this path.
The internationally more and more persuasive means of the militarization of internatioal relations, has resulted in today’s societies as to appear increasingly vulnerable, and less open minded to an more endangered state of the art and practical threat of war. The security risks, which now arise on the decision-making level in the United States and partners, also like to go back to miscalculations of the respective dominant elites security, and even exacerbating work into unilateral military characterized interational power- struggles. The more convincing the military expert elites, also due to technological development, these may predict what powers will be set up on which side and what that means as a whole, and where, to be united, the more convincing these elites argue, the outcome of such a war might become predicted (1854 Palmerston/ Clarendon, 1914 – Moltke/Jagow – 1940 Hitler/Blomberg-v.Brauchitsch).
But why do you want to fight? The weaker side – does not want, the stronger – not needs to fight. The compromise, checkmate or surrender. The road to war in the recitals of the ruling elites of descending powers can take place in the following steps:
1. becoming conscious of declining industrial skills, (1854, 1914, 1991 (2014),
2. experience of easing the forces in relation to its own sphere of influence (1991ff.),
3. reinforcing alliance commitments (1854, 1912-13, 2014),
4. strengthen the military armor (1851/54, 1913/14, 2010ff.),
5. increasing involvement in military conflicts (1848ff., 1991ff.),
6. continuation of this trend, with aim towards the general war (1852ff., 1911/14, 2013).
As in the 1980ies, could science nowadays provide the answer to the question of how long such, more and more, autistic behaving powers and power blocs evoke in their minds an impression of the downturn of their development; hesitation, more and more brought into distress, and set by upgrading under pressure, resort to the war. And those powers of today are Russia and the United States.
This may help the careful analysis of the economy and industrial criteria, as related. Also for the years before 1870 there emerges a range of „young powers“ that seem suitable to displace the senior States. In modern wars, more than in the previous centuries, shows the extent of the military-financial commitment of the winner around the world, the degree of the high and mighty power of this state in the ascent to the summit – or their descent. In our days occurs this, and is now intensified as to the United States and in the focus of interest. A fatigue process of this previous superpower is unmistakably of interest since the Korea-, Berlin-, Cuba-, Vietnam-, Iran-Wars and crises on the one hand and the Kuwait-, Iraq-, Afghanistan-Wars, on the other hand. Today, adjunct: North Africa-, Egypt-, Syria- and Crime-crises.
Meanwhile, the contemporary historical developments of the basic questions of the 80ies also are advanced. These served the analysis of military spending and quantitative strength of the armies. For instance the famous „tank counting“ of the Peace Research Institutes. A more or less badly overestimated device, but it went on these fertile fields not so much about „peace-„, rather than war-research. Guide vectors of the analysis formed, among other things, for the period between 1816 and 1970/80, iron- and steel- production and industrial energy-consumption. The „young powers“ built a major result of these analyzes. Whether this is true of Prussia, France and Sardinia-Piemont in the 1850ies or for Germany and Japan in the 30ies of the 20th century.
It was, and is, the displacement of the senior States. The parameters of the circumference of the initiatives, investments and commitments, made after successful wars which should show, whether the particular winning of the United States was still in a state of the rise or already of decline. It went 1850/1914 (Czarist Russia), and is today to the determination of the moment, in the 1991/2014 a decrease in the ability of the main and leading powers (USSR 1978-82 / 2014, Russia) is given (was) relevant to influence, if this
a) shall implicate in an increasing number of military conflicts. A mere clash is unlikely to cause to go to the brink of war. However, this point could be exceeded if a call to arms, a parade of military force, violence or fighting one devices (Crimea, the Donets 2014/15). For the controllability of such escalations like for Russia in 1953, 1956, 1967 and 1968 speak.
b) such militarized disputes are found more often within or on the edges of zones of influence of alliance and of political post-war developments, as outside of it.
c) the results of such developments will make from time to time sobering (for the United States: 1952-53 Korea 1956 Suez 1958 Berlin 1962 Cuba 1978 Persia, 1963-1975 Vietnam; today: Kuwait, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria / Isis Mosul).
This is here displayed to see how explosive is the situation develops now; as US policy must be examined to determine whether, as a result of increased armor, the domestic political prestige drops correspondingly to moderate solutions and becomes less attractive; as well, an increasing militarization of foreign policy is given space. Asked empirically, it remains to be determined, whether increasing alliance-commitments have increased the result of military mobilizations.
Against this background, now also unstable, power position of the US, and the company resulting from the inferior position of power, the Russian offensive with limited objectives in the Donets Basin, are new potential hazards, because the conflicting parties both appear injured and capable of an, shown here, incorrect, armoured response. Whether it would now be obvious, as in the years 1853-55 between Britain, Austria, Prussia and France, conducted against Russia in order to negotiate in extenso and in continuity; probably this does not work, as to the conclusion that both sides still don’t further search to avoid the military conflict.
To the aim of reaching the verdict of history, the following questions may lead:
– How regularly a post-war hierarchy begins to unravel?
– How fast, how largely will this happen?
– Detect national security-elites the changing configurations of power and influence; and how early is this taking place?
– Recognising this exactly, and to what extent, the reality, or above of all,
– Answers this, as if hypnotized, with strengthening their alliance and military obligations or focus them on the reinforcement of the army – or both?
If the slope of sinking powers to militarized and less imaginative foreign policy, lower success rates in clashes, brings forth, the self-affirmation process is amplified and finally lead such experiences such powers to a more warlike than historical experience? This assumption was confirmed by no means yet. It was ultimately to investigate about the importance of the militarization of companies in connection with their decrease of power politics. Furthermore, there rests the question of the process in the space through which continue the nations the ravages of war, and recharge those, who expect peace from them.
Cause and reason for these considerations was the observation that between 1960 and 1980, both the UdSSR and the USA, faced with an extremely ambiguous decrease of their ability, looked to international events, influenced and controlled. A stressed increase of the militarization of foreign policy was observed, and the steady increase in military expenditures. It was the realization of interest in such studies, during the 1983-84 in the United States, if stress was laid on the concern if humanity were in the foreground from the effects of this development, or rather the tapping of the power-base of the UdSSR for possible military solutions in Central Europe. This question is now, made new in the face of the crises of the Crime and Donez. That it was about a possible confrontation between the two systems, and that the idea of „the war- frivolity of aging kingdoms“ were conducting in those years, according to the comparative cases of 1852-54 and 1914, by which the observer from Germany weren’t surprised then or now.
But the knowledge of 1989 is, by no means, the alliance political confidence-boosting. It is now Europe in a mess, even to become a world power, and the United States have decided to prevent this. A crack went accordingly through NATO. Provoked ultimately by a remote US foreign policy towards residual Russia, which is no longer recognized as a power-factor of remarkable significance. Decisive for everything seems that the US-policy – like England in the autumn of 1853 – has decided unilaterally that power-presence of Russia finally is to be reduced. And this in continuation of the blows that this 1991ff did suffer. The counter-movements in Russia are negligible in this bill. At the same time, this particular aggressiveness met in the US foreign policy a further condition for the hot conflict, namely in addition to the EU-policy of expansion to the east since 1991. But so that the EU pulls – led by US-American approach, to a localized conventional war in Europe as the result from the fact that Russia can only reach to the EU in Ukrain but not the US. The US may target and follow the expansionist England/Germany/Prussia in 1854 and 1914. So the generals in Moscow, on the question, „what can we do against the USA (?)“, may have replied the same as Moltke in crisis-meeting, held in June 1909:
„We can (only) fencebreak a war with Ukraine – but nothing more.“
All talk and entertainment activities, so all political science in history in being (Steinmeier) doesn’t, so to say, help, when war is decided in advance – like of England in the autumn of 1853 at Windsor Castle, and in Germany before 1914.